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By Knocks Tapiwa Zengeni 
 
 
This paper looks at the changing political equation in Zimbabwe since the emergence of powerful 
opposition at the turn of the century. As a result new political players and entrepreneurs have entered the 
political market and in the process challenging the founding fathers of the nation. An unprecedented 
political and economic crisis added new complexities to the future of the country and political rules of the 
game. In this sense, a new political regime arose in the form of a power-sharing framework involving the 
main political players in 2008. So, what lessons can Zimbabwe learn from the Malaysian consociational 
arrangement? The central proposition of this paper is that Zimbabwe can learn a lot from Malaysia despite 
the apparent differing circumstances and dynamics between the two countries. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The crisis in the past decade in the once relatively peaceful and prosperous country of 
Zimbabwe has culminated in serious economic and political crises. Zimbabwe has been 
in the throes of a permanent state of crisis in the past decade or so. This crisis has 
transformed the once „jewel of Africa‟ into a critically weak state experiencing a sharp 
and potentially destabilising political and socio-economic decline. An estimated three 
million Zimbabweans have fled into South Africa and other countries as a matter of 
survival; more than three-quarters of the remaining population of nine million face 
serious food insecurity; maternal mortality has tripled since the mid-1990s; a cholera 
epidemic in 2008 infected over 90,000 people, killing over 4,000; 80-90% of the 
population is officially unemployed; and political violence during elections and other 
major political events continue unabated. At the epicentre of the challenges facing 
Zimbabwe are issues associated with economic attrition. The economic decline has 
brought industrial and agricultural production to a virtual standstill. Furthermore, the 
country‟s basic infrastructure and public services have all but deteriorated. In an attempt 
to resolve its political and socio-economic crises, Zimbabwe has recently joined a 
growing number of states that have agreed to employ power sharing as a strategy to 
resolve civil conflicts or crises. From Kenya to Zimbabwe and now Iraq, power sharing 
measures have recently assumed great importance in conflict resolution and management. 
In 2008 at the height of the Zimbabwe crisis, the major political actors in the country 
under the aegis of South Africa agreed to a power sharing formula that ushered in an 
inclusive government in 2009.  However, this arrangement known as the Global Political 
Agreement has not been very successful. The main argument of this paper is that 
Zimbabwe can learn a lot from Malaysia‟s experience with consociationalism despite the 
evident contextual disparities. The paper also recognizes the significance of Hatzell and 
Hoddie (2003) study on how power-sharing institutions might best be designed to 
stabilize the transition to enduring peace among former enemies following a negotiated 
political settlement. 
 
 Earlier attempts at power sharing in Zimbabwe 
 
The phenomenon of power sharing is not new to Zimbabwe. During the colonial era 
when the liberation war had proved too hot for the minority white regime in the 1970s, 
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the Rhodesia government of Ian Douglas Smith yielded to a power sharing formula with 
moderate black leaders. This power sharing formula came to be known as the „Internal 
Settlement‟1  and its  main objective was to provide a basis for international recognition 
of the country and the lifting of sanctions which had been imposed when the white 
regime imposed the infamous Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965. 
However the Internal Settlement fared badly. The new Rhodesian constitution which 
came into effect on 1 June, 1979, provided that the white minority would be able to block 
in Parliament, any unwelcome constitutional changes, but incorporated the principle of 
black majority rule. These proposals had previously been submitted in a referendum to 
the whites, who approved them but the blacks were not asked whether they approved it or 
not. Essentially, the „internal settlement‟ left the white minority with an entrenched 
position. Whites were guaranteed nearly one-third of the seats in parliament, one quarter 
of the places in the cabinet and control of the police, army, civil service and judiciary. 
Unsurprisingly, both the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation of African Unity 
castigated this lop-sided power sharing arrangement. By August 1979, Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia the republic created by the Internal Settlement had not been recognized by any 
other state. Even Apartheid South Africa had not formally recognized Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia‟s government under the leadership of the puppet Bishop Abel Muzorewa. 
Despite appeals by Bishop Muzorewa to the Patriotic Front
2
 forces to surrender and 
frequent predictions by politicians in Salisbury that the war would come to an end, the 
war showed no signs of abating (Gregory 1980:18). Ironically the security situation 
worsened. By 1979 the Patriotic Front forces stood some way short of a military victory. 
 
 Eventually, in 1979, all the parties agreed to attend peace talks at the Lancaster House 
Conference which was brokered by Britain, the former colonial power. The Lancaster 
House Agreement which the parties had concluded was basically a compromise. The 
Rhodesian leader Ian Smith was overhead at the sidelines of the talks to have 
euphemistically suggested that “we have decided to give them the politics and we keep 
the banks”3.This agreement paved the way for majority rule, while providing important 
guarantees for white property and especially white landowners, who were entitled to 
demand compensation in foreign currency for any land seized by the new black 
government. Furthermore, the whites were also given enough seats in parliament20 out of 
100) to block any changes in the constitution that they did not approve for the first seven 
years of independence. A peculiar and striking feature of both the internal and Lancaster 
House settlements was the retention of a significant number of parliamentary seats 
reserved for a white electorate. This reflected a wish among Rhodesian whites to 
maintain a distinct and separate status from the rest of the population. One thing Smith  
 
1 
The Internal Settlement was signed by Ian Smith, Bishop Muzorewa, the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole 
and Chief Chirau on March 3 1978, which led to the election of Bishop Muzorewa as Prime Minister of 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in April 1979. 
2 
In October 1976, the leading nationalist movements the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) under 
Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) under Joshua Nkomo had agreed to 
form a loose political union, the Patriotic Front. 
3This quote is attributed to Masipula Sithole‟s recollections as a delegate at the Lancaster House Talks. 
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did achieve in the Lancaster House Agreement was an agreement that no form of 
compulsory land redistribution would take place for at least 10 years after independence, 
securing the immediate position of the white farming community. The Agreement also 
gave unconditional immunity from prosecution to all those who had participated in UDI 
and the bush war. The Lancaster House accord was bound to fail in the long run because 
it did not address the fundamental obstacle to racial reconciliation in Zimbabwe, that is, 
the problem of a highly skewed dualist economy in which the minority whites controlled 
the levers of the economy.  
 
A much more successful power sharing or consociational arrangement was the 
unity agreement of 1987. During the country’s formative years in the 1980s the 
two major political forces at the time, ZANU PF (predominantly Shona led and 
supported) and PF ZAPU (predominantly Ndebele led and supported) clashed 
and led to the break-up of the government of national unity. The new antagonists 
were the two major politico-military organizations that had fought to bring the racist 
white minority regime in Rhodesia to an end. From the beginning, the two organizations 
differed over strategy, tactics, and purpose, which persisted into independence. Neither 
the common enemy nor the shared overall objective of liberation could bridge the divide 
(DuToit, 1995: 142). Furthermore, the two movements had different international and 
regional sponsors which deepened their rivarly. ZANU was aided by China and sheltered 
by Mozambique whilst ZAPU had received the patronage of the Soviet Union, and found 
safe haven in Zambia. During the later stages of the liberation war, the two parties and 
their leaders, although personal and ideological rivals, were allied in a loose political 
alliance, the Patriotic Front  (PF). By the end of the war, ZANU and its military arm 
ZANLA (which had carried out most of the fighting against the Rhodesian Forces) 
controlled approximately three quarters of Zimbabwean territory, while ZAPU controlled 
Matabeleland, its stronghold (see Atlas & Roy Licklider 1999:40). For Zimbabwe‟s first 
democratic elections, held in accordance with the Lancaster House Accord in 1980, 
Mugabe and Nkomo ran on separate tickets. To almost everyone‟s amazement, Mugabe 
won 57 of the 80 seats designated for the black majority. Although some ZAPU officials, 
including Nkomo himself, served in Mugabe‟s ZANU-PF government from 1980-82, the 
political rivalry between the two leaders and their organizations soon turned sour and 
violent.  
 
Moreover, while the new Zimbabwean National Army (ZNA) was in the process of being 
formed, the armed forces of ZANLA and ZIPRA were not fully disarmed or demobilized. 
As tensions increased in the demobilization camps, skirmishes between them also broke 
out. When the ZAPU arms caches were discovered, ZANU-PF saw these actions as a 
blatant challenge to its authority and to its new and still unsteady political relationship 
with the white minority. Convinced that the dissident attacks that emerged soon after the 
discovery of the arms caches,  were being co-ordinated by PF- ZAPU, Robert Mugabe 
dismissed ZAPU affiliated ministers including its leader Joshua Nkomo from his cabinet. 
Ohlson and Stedman (1994: 89) suggest that “Mugabe‟s decision to jettison Nkomo and 
ZAPU in the post-Lancaster House elections set the stage for a bloody struggle between 
the two parties”. While the dissidents‟ major targets were ZANU-PF government 
facilities and personnel, some of their frustration was vented on the large-scale white 
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commercial landowners living in their midst. The former Rhodesians, the target during 
the liberation war, were benefiting far more from the post-Lancaster House reality than 
was the liberation movement of ZAPU. The dissidents‟ central grievances rested on a 
perception that the Ndebele people, and especially ZIPRA veterans, were being 
discriminated against and excluded from power, and yet they had also fought for 
independence (Kriger, 1992: 149). On the other hand, the government‟s position was that 
the  principle reason for the rise of insurgency since 1982 in western parts of Zimbabwe 
had been PF ZAPU‟s refusal to accept electoral defeat it suffered in 1980 (see Weitzer, 
1984). In the early 1980s the Mugabe regime had a clear national economic interest in 
placating the whites, particularly in the early years of Zimbabwean independence, where 
the regime was fearful of white exodus.   Thus, in order to placate and protect his former 
white enemy, Mugabe attacked constituent elements of his former black civil war ally, 
Nkomo‟s ZAPU/ZIPRA and the people of Matabeleland. Ohlson and Steadman (1994) 
have also suggested that the dissidents may have received material and financial 
assistance from Apartheid South Africa. This possibility of South African involvement 
compelled the ZANU PF (PF) government to treat dissidents as a serious threat to the 
regime‟s security. The Zimbabwean government had seen the transformation of the 
Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) by South Africa from a bunch of bandits into a 
formidable fighting machine. The MNR had previously been handled by the former 
Rhodesian white regime as a spoiler against ZANLA freedom fighters. It was for this 
reason that the government dispatched its armed forces including the much feared North 
Korean-trained Fifth Brigade or the Gukarahundi to put down the revolt. The 
Gukarahundi forces ruthlessly suppressed the revolt and allegations of mass killings of 
civilians have since been leveled against the brigade.  
 
Over the years, “the cumulative attacks on ZAPU drove Nkomo into a series of on-again, 
off-again negotiations with ZANU officials. Both sides had an interest in coming to terms 
and ending the political and military contest. ZAPU had not made any clear gains in its 
policy of opposing the Mugabe regime and feared becoming ever more marginal in 
Zimbabwean politics, and Nkomo had himself grown tired of his exile from formal 
political power (see Ohlson & Stedman, 1994: 91). Mugabe and the ZANU-PF 
machinery needed to bring the violence to a halt, in order to encourage white commercial 
farmers to remain in Matabeleland and to remove any opportunity for South African 
intervention. Therefore in December 1987, the two sides signed a national unity pact. In 
accordance with this negotiated settlement, Nkomo and other ZAPU leaders were brought 
back into the government, and ZAPU was to be merged into ZANU-PF. A general 
amnesty was issued to the dissidents in May 1988 and the parties were merged in 
December 1989 (just in time for the next parliamentary elections). Following the signing 
of the Unity Accords, the fighting ceased in Matabeleland. Despite all the denials of any 
connection between the armed dissidents and ZAPU/ZIPRA, organized dissidence did in 
fact come to a halt once Mugabe and Nkomo reached political agreement in December 
1987. The Mugabe regime became fully consolidated after 1987, once the national unity 
pact was signed. The ZANU-ZAPU negotiated settlement and merger brought to an end 
the main organised black opposition to Mugabe‟s and ZANU-PF‟s rule. In a way this 
formalised Zimbabwe‟s move toward a de facto one-party state system which 
characterised the politics of the country for long periods before the emergence of the 
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Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). One of the major reasons why this attempt at 
power sharing was relatively successful was that the two competing forces had a common 
denominator, that is, there were liberation movements. As alluded earlier, these two 
formations had earlier established a loose political front at the height of the liberation war 
indicating the potential for a grand coalition. 
 
The national unity government had several benefits. Firstly, the 1987 elite helped to de-
ethnicise national politics. Thus, at least the country was saved from a potential ethnic 
conflict which is endemic in African states. During the liberation era and the formative 
years of the 1980s, ZANU-PF had been largely perceived as Shona-based and PF-ZAPU 
was largely seen as Ndebele-supported. (The Shona constitute about 82 percent of the 
population while the Ndebele represent 16 percent of the population). In a way the 1987 
Unity Accord was an act of national reconciliation and inclusion. PF-ZAPU wanted their 
role in the struggle to be acknowledged at par with their liberation counterparts, ZANU 
PF. PF- ZAPU resented their exclusion from the spoils of power and was irked by the 
fact that the “loser” of the anti-colonial war, the whites had fared far better economically 
than they did. With the Unity Accord, PF- ZAPU‟s place in „patriotic history‟ was sealed 
thus ensuring a role for its members in Zimbabwe‟s future. Secondly, while the 1987 
Unity Accord effectively eliminated the main black opposition party by merging it into 
ZANU-PF (much to Mugabe‟s benefit), it was also an act of regime security. It brought 
the other black liberation movement back into the fold. In so doing, major grievances 
were addressed including a possible manipulation of ZAPU by Apartheid South Africa 
during this Cold War era. Nonetheless, the resolution of the Matabeleland disturbances 
had led some observers to conclude that it was done at the cost of multiparty democracy 
in Zimbabwe (see Ohlson and Steadman 1994). In fact, Zimbabwe had to wait for 
thirteen years in order to experience competitive politics in the country in 2000.  
 
 
Sources of the present crisis in Zimbabwe and factors influencing the need for 
power sharing  
Liberation war mandate - Special rights of war veterans: Adding to the woes of the 
present crisis in Zimbabwe has been the role of the military or the security sector in 
politics whose members and leaders were also ingrained in the values of the liberation 
struggle as freedom fighters. In a way, liberation war veterans believe that their 
participation in the liberation war has bestowed them with „special rights‟ that they 
should guard jealously indefinetly. It should be noted that Zimbabwe‟s defence and 
security forces were born out of a successful integration of three former warring parties, 
that is, ZANLA, ZIPRA and the Rhodesian security forces. In the long run the rank and 
file of these forces have since been dominated by cadres from the liberation movements 
particularly ZANLA. The domination of security apparatus by former freedom fighters 
has challenged the legacy of the supremacy of civilian control of the military as most 
senior military officers act as ZANU PF party functionaries. Martin Rupiya (2004) 
observes that the Zimbabwean liberation movement model is generally based on popular 
causes and mass participation; strong personalities generally emerge as the leadership 
enjoy cult status. Its structure is cohesive and there is undivided political and military 
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fusion representing the interests of the ruling regime. According to Rupiya, in moments 
of crisis, the interwoven liberation movement politico-military relationship acts in 
support of the survival of the whole. This intricate relationship between Zimbabwe‟s 
political and military entities, which has its roots in Maoist political organization, was 
aptly demonstrated when the military indicated before the 2002 and 2008 presidential 
elections that they would not countenance anyone who did not participate in the 
liberation struggle. Although the origins of military intervention in politics are obscure 
and the precise timings of the transformation is hard to pin down. The military first 
became openly political on 9 January 2002 when, flanked by other members of the Joint 
Operations Command (JOC), the late General Vitalis Zvinavashe, a liberation war hero 
and commander of the Defence Forces of Zimbabwe (both army and the airforce), issued 
a press statement insisting that the office of the Head of State of Zimbabwe should be 
held by individuals who “pursue Zimbabwean values, traditions and beliefs for which 
thousands of lives were lost in pursuit of Zimbabwe‟s hard-won independence, 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interest” (Obituary: General Vitalis 
Zvinavashe- Department of Information and Publicity 2009: 8; BBC News 9.1.2002). 
“To this end” he added, “let it be known that the highest office in the land is a straitjacket 
whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. We will, 
therefore, not accept, let alone support or salute anyone with a different agenda that 
threatens the very existence of our sovereignty, our country and our people”. The 
directive was apparently aimed at the MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai who is not a 
liberation war veteran. Perhaps the most instructive case of the liberation war mandate 
was delivered by the powerful Zimbabwe‟s defence minister and potential  successor to 
President Mugabe, Emmerson Mnangagwa. According to Mnangagwa, when he 
addressed ZANU PF supporters in October 2010: 
 
Let me point out clearly that this country came at a very 
huge price that we can not allow it to slip back into the 
hands of neo-imperialists. We would have betrayed the 
blood and wishes of those dead comrades who yearned for 
a non racial and equal Zimbabwe. So let it be clear to those 
who have imposed illegal sanctions on us that sanctions or 
no sanctions, Zimbabwe will never be a colony again. The 
price that was paid for this country to be independent was 
just too high. We can’t fail those departed comrades who 
shed their blood to see a prosperous Zimbabwe. MDC is 
not a people-driven party. It is directed from somewhere. It 
is a puppet political party. (The Herald 2010, 1 November) 
 
On a related issue, R.W. Johnson (2001) observes that no liberation movement in 
Southern Africa has ever lost power, or considers it thinkable that it should do so. To put 
it differently, former freedom fighters believe and behave as if they have „special rights‟ 
in the country. Thus in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique, Angola and South Africa, the 
problem of a dominant party state system in Southern Africa seems to be ubiquitous in 
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the region. This situation is aided and abetted by an unstated assumption or principle that 
former guerrilla combatants have the right to cling to power for life. As such, ZANU PF 
has loomed large in the country as a liberation icon and has presented itself as the 
defender and custodian of Zimbabwe‟s liberation values. As such it is only an icon like 
ZANU PF that makes a virtue of bringing the country a punishing economic adjustment 
programme and an equally punitive land reform programme. Like all liberation 
movements in Southern Africa that got into power through the „barrel of the gun‟ there is 
exclusive nationhood. Citizens who did not participate in the liberation struggle and do 
not belong to ZANU PF are vilified as unpatriotic and traitors without any special rights 
to participate in Zimbabwe‟s political structures. Clearly, as stated by Ndlovu –Gatsheni 
(2004), the war of liberation has reinforced rather than undermined authoritarian culture. 
In a way the enduring influence of the liberation war on Zimbabwe‟s body politic has 
been both positive and negative. Whilst the people‟s war brought independence, some of 
its legacies have placed a heavy burden on post colonial Zimbabwe. Hence, it is 
imperative to see clearly both the positive aspects and possible limitations of the people‟s 
war in Zimbabwe. 
 
Therefore the rising influence of the military and security leadership in the political 
succession struggle in Zimbabwe in the last decade should be understood from that 
context. Zimbabwe‟s armed and security forces have always been a pillar of the ruling 
party‟s power but recent times have seen increasing military involvement in the party 
machinery and policy formulation. The Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF), the Zimbabwe 
Republic Police (ZRP), and the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) have all been 
meticulously politicised so that their primary responsibility and loyalty is to the ZANU-
PF leadership. The military/security complex is likely to continue to play an important 
role in the politics of Zimbabwe, particularly in the backdrop of the inextricably link 
between security forces and the ruling ZANU PF elite. The political value of the military 
has risen within the Mugabe regime, particularly at a time when the country is beset with 
unprecedented political and economic challenges. According to senior government 
officials and other analysts in Zimbabwe, the military-security complex is playing its role 
as „guardian‟, protector and custodian of the state and liberation values (Tomana 2009 int; 
Mandiwanzira 2009 int.).  
 
 
The legacy of the Gukurahundi: Another factor that underlines the importance of power 
sharing is the unending legacy of the Gukarahundi which has continued to affect ethnic 
relations to this day. Essentially, the legacy of the government military operations in 
Matabeleland otherwise known as the Gukurahundi  have refused to fade away. In 1984 
the government appointed the Chihambakwe Commission of Inquiry to investigate the 
allegations of excesses by the Fifth brigade. The findings of the Commission were 
withheld from the public and the Fifth Brigade was withdrawn and subsequently 
disbanded. However, in April 1999 a joint Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace  
(CCJP) and the Legal Resources Fund (LRF) publication Breaking the silence chronicled 
the operations of the Gukarahundi and stated that several thousands of people were killed 
during the operation. This publication provoked debate on the Gukarahundi issue which 
has since continued to dominate political discourse in the country. The issue has also 
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created problems for the ruling regime as some human rights organisations have branded 
the military operation as genocidal. As a result, calls for a human rights tribunal have 
been advocated by both local and international NGOs.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the fear of retribution from the Matabeland episode is one of the main 
reasons behind ZANU PF‟s aggressive regime security agenda. The fear of possible 
reprisals in the event of a regime change is not far fetched considering the increasing 
importance of the humanitarianism as an agenda in the international community. Media 
reports in 2008 indicated that the ruling South Africa‟s African National Congress 
secretary general Gwede Mantashe, had claimed that Zimbabwe‟s Robert Mugabe had 
„real fears‟ of being hauled before the International Criminal Court in the Hague, if he 
were to relinquish power (Zimbabwe Situation online 12.12.2008). Mantashe allegedly 
made the claim in Durban during a breakfast meeting with journalists and editors. He 
revealed that the higher structures of the ANC had discussed Mugabe‟s reasons for 
wanting to stay in power and that he was afraid of being arrested and charged with war 
crimes like former Liberian President Charles Taylor
4
. The opposition‟s monopoly over 
victim-hood, and the military‟s complicit responsibility in so much of the violence since 
the Gukarahundi had served to harden the survival instincts of the Mugabe regime. Some 
senior ZANU PF officials including the military top brass are afraid of possible 
prosecution for human rights abuse in the event of a transfer of power. For instance, the 
commander of the Airforce of Zimbabwe, Air Marshal Perence Shiri was the Commander 
of the Fifth Brigade (The Gukurahundi) in the infamous 1980s pogrom in Matabeleland. 
         
 Emergence of strong post-liberation opposition: Opposition politics in Zimbabwe has 
also contributed to the political crisis in the country. According to Dorman (2003: 846) at 
independence the ruling regime had sought to consolidate the coalition of social forces 
that had supported it during the liberation war, and to expand its coalition to incorporate 
groups that had remained outside such as, ZAPU, interest groups and even the former 
Rhodesian Front, on its own terms. Dorman termed this phenomenon as the politics of 
inclusion. During the mid-1990s, however, a number of civil society organizations, 
especially the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) an umbrella labour union 
which was led by Morgan Tsvangrai emerged as pressure groups to oppose the dominant 
rule of ZANU-PF, challenging emerging corruption, human rights violations and poor 
governance in general. This expanding political space for civil society also allowed for 
the emergence of a strong opposition that ultimately led to a powerful alliance of forces 
that mobilized Zimbabwe‟s public opinion. The opposition was also aided by the 
implications of the so-called home grown Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 
(ESAP) which had created much expectation. Against such expectations, the economic 
situation worsened. Revelations of corruption in the independent press became frequent 
and increased the levels of unpopularity of the ruling regime.  
 
 
 
4
 Taylor, who was Liberia‟s president from 1997 to 2003, was forced into exile in Nigeria before being 
extradited. He is currently being detained at the International Criminal Court detention facility in the 
Hague, awaiting trial for gross human rights violations.  
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Furthermore, two political factors which were essentially regime survival strategies 
deepened the economic crisis in the late 1990s and simultaneously strengthened the hand 
of the opposition. First, the appeasement policy towards war veterans of the liberation 
struggle adopted in 1997 when the Government decided to issue unbudgeted cash 
handouts to ex-combatants who had threatened to destabilize the government with a 
public display of discontent at the time, impacted negatively on the economy. The 
decision threw the economy into chaos, and distanced the business and farming 
communities from the ruling regime. The hand-outs of Z$50,000 per each war veteran 
(the veterans were estimated to have numbered 50, 000) sparked an inflationary spiral 
from which the economy has still to recover. The cash hand-outs are often attributed to 
have kicked off the downward spiral of the economy, as the Zimbabwe dollar fell from 
1:10 to 1:27 to the US dollar in the same year. By the mid-2000s the official exchange 
rate was 1:10,000 and 1:23000 in the parallel market (Tibaijuka Report 2005:16).  
Secondly, international confidence in Zimbabwe‟s economy was evidently shattered 
further in August 1998 when Mugabe decided to deploy Zimbabwean army forces in 
support of president Laurent Kabila against rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Zimbabwe, together with Angola, and Namibia 
sent troops to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to protect Inga dam which 
supplies part of Zimbabwe‟s electricity and the government in the DRC from invasion by 
both Uganda and Rwanda.  The participation in this war was controversial and costly. 
While Zimbabwe‟s senior political leaders and army officers probably profited personally 
from the business opportunities in the DRC, the government‟s attempts to finance the war 
through the war itself were vain (Laakso 2002:446). Clearly, this military intervention 
had serious consequences in terms of budgetary allocations and deficits. On 30 August in 
response to an opposition question in parliament, the Minister of Finance, stated that 
between August 1998 and June 2000 the DRC engagement had cost the country Z$10 
billion which was roughly US$200 million (ICG Africa Briefing Paper 25 September 
2000: 7). The minister also pointed out that the country‟s economy could not sustain this 
military expenditure. The DRC adventure provoked a lot of criticism among the 
opposition and civic groups and probably also among ordinary soldiers. Though the 
decision to participate in the DRC war had enabled the regime to divert the people‟s 
attention from domestic issues, this decision later snowballed and worsened the country‟s 
prospects. At the height of the war the country had almost no foreign currency reserves. 
Electricity and petrol supplies were sustained despite the debts only because of the 
support of South Africa‟s electricity utility Eskom and oil company Sasol. 
 
 Furthermore, Zimbabwe‟s entry in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) war has 
been cited as one of the main reasons behind Western hostility against the ZANU PF 
regime. As a result of misunderstanding of the political correctness of Zimbabwe‟s entry 
into the DRC war from August 1998 some Western nations slapped arms embargoes 
against Zimbabwe. In 1999, Zimbabwe‟s annual application to the IMF was vetoed by 
Britain and the United States on the pretext that it was too poor to involve itself in the 
war in the DRC
5;
 and therefore, they should be denied any further funds, so that they  
 
5 
Surprisingly, on the same day, Zimbabwe‟s belligerents in the DRC Rwanda and Uganda had their 
applications approved by the IMF despite being poorer to Zimbabwe (Rowlands 2002).  
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could not indulge in those kind of adventures. Whatever the truth, there was no visible 
support for the DRC expedition and there was also widespread belief that the DRC 
adventure was a major contributor to Zimbabwe‟s economic woes. These developments 
only strengthened the people‟s support for the opposition. 
 
The government‟s defeat in a constitutional referendum in 2000, demonstrated the 
unpopularity of the Zimbabwe government. In a big way, the result of the plebiscite 
transformed the MDC into a publicly legitimated voice and force. In essence, the 
electorate‟s verdict implicitly ushered in a new political dispensation in the country. 
Inevitably, this would set the stage for the violent and coercive politics that have since 
dominated the political arena in Zimbabwe. The referendum result represented a stunning 
defeat for President Mugabe and as a result compelled the ruling ZANU-PF to soul 
search and revive its waning political fortunes. As noted by Laakso (2001) the urban 
protest was hardly surprising, but the rural reluctance to support the government reflected 
a very different pattern from earlier elections. To save themselves, the ruling elites once 
again began to harp of the land issue for all its ills.  Coincidently, the opposition began to 
enjoy the support of the white minority, and received Western patronage and support. 
Some Western powers and organisations such as the Westminster Foundation openly 
indicated that they funded the activities of the MDC (see Government of Zimbabwe 
report - The Commonwealth and the Zimbabwe Presidential Election 2002). These 
developments have resulted in the opposition being branded as a front for the Western 
interests and white commercial farmers. This has also generated an inherent fear amongst 
the ruling party elites that the MDC will reverse the liberation ethos and values 
particularly on the land question.  
 
During and after the 2000 general elections, political violence, primarily against MDC 
supporters, escalated dramatically as a strategy to counter the groundswell of urban 
opposition. For ZANU PF the potential transition would entail serious financial 
consequences for the losing side. The ruling ZANU PF elite drew heavily on political 
party affiliations in the structuring of patronage ties and this patronage network included 
the military and security brass, the war veterans and senior party officials. The regime 
faced opposition groups with visibly different support bases, many of which undoubtedly 
joined the opposition on account of this very exclusion from the patronage system. The 
ruling elites had little illusion about the fact that in such circumstances the struggle for 
political power through the democratic game would mean all or nothing. Starting from a 
position of strength, the Mugabe regime had no interest in entering a process which could 
cost them everything. Thus, the open political contest had raised exceptionally high 
stakes in the zero-sum political game in Zimbabwe. Though continued authoritarian rule, 
or authoritarian reversal, could not have been a viable option for countries so dependent 
on external aid, like Zimbabwe in the post-Cold War era. In this particular context of the 
late third wave democratic consensus, ruling regimes were effectively required to proceed 
with at least a nominal democratic transition, with opposition forces.  But what followed 
in Zimbabwe in the past decade defied all odds. The ruling regime was determined to 
maintain its hold on power at all costs.  And it did just that, despite the growing 
popularity of civic and opposition groups. 
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The Western regime change agenda: Perhaps the most significant factor that has 
poisoned Zimbabwe‟s political scene has been the Western regime change agenda.  There 
should be little doubt that the crisis in Zimbabwe is partly framed by ongoing „global‟ 
democracy promotion, whose parameters are both being defined by the policy elite in 
Washington and embraced by their counterparts in Europe. In Zimbabwe, where Western 
leverage and linkage are relatively high, the impact of external western pressure has been 
very strong. As one of the most aid-dependent countries in the world, Zimbabwe‟s 
vulnerability to regime change pressure has been extremely high. Zimbabwe‟s linkages to 
the West are strong due to the presence of a relatively big white population in the 
country. As a result the Mugabe regime has faced intense scrutiny mainly from western 
countries. Moreover, the business community‟s dependence and connections to western 
foreign capital maximises the number of pressure points available to the West. Since 
independence in 1980 Zimbabwe‟s economy was controlled by the white minority who in 
turn were controlled by or directly related to the multi-national corporations (Nkiwane 
1993:206).  It was apparent that the ZANU PF government was held hostage to the needs 
of foreign capital which demanded the image of a moderate and practical regime for the 
greater period of post-independence. As noted by  Clarke cited in Hentz (1994), a 
thorough analysis of foreign investment in Zimbabwe indicates that “it would be hard to 
find a case comparable to Zimbabwe in which the role of foreign investment is so long 
established, deeply integrated into the sectors producing the bulk of the output, and so 
strongly interconnected with local capital”. (Hentz 1994: 213).  In actual fact a report by 
the Whitsun Foundation indicated that external interests had interacted with local firms or 
the local companies to the extent that “should Zimbabwe willingly or otherwise damage 
its relationship with external business, it is to be expected that this will inflict problems 
on local enterprises” (Hentz 1994:213). Arguing along similar lines, Zimbabwe‟s 
Attorney General, Johannes Tomana, that indicated that the country‟s “economy was 
crafted and woven in a manner that made it part of the Western world and that is why 
when those linkages were cut the economy deteriorated rapidly” (Tomana 2009 int.). It is 
within this context therefore that we must seek to understand the severity of Western 
punitive actions on Zimbabwe.   
 
 
Since assuming power in 1980, Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe has had a love-
hate relationship with western governments and donor institutions. However, in recent 
times the western donor community have been eager to isolate and sanction the Mugabe 
regime especially after the land reclamation exercise targeted at white                  
commercial farmers provoked international condemnation in 2000. The resulting frosty 
relationship between the Western donor community and the Mugabe regime has 
negatively affected the record of economic governance and democratic performance in 
Zimbabwe since 2000.  While the members of the western community do not have 
identical policies toward Zimbabwe, they did adopt a common hostile stance toward 
Mugabe and employed sufficiently coercive approaches to justify a common position. 
The paradigmatic shift in Western policy towards Zimbabwe has created a permissive 
international hostile environment which has weakened the Mugabe regime, encouraged 
civil society players, and sparked an upsurge in opposition mobilisation in the country. 
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Consequently, in Zimbabwe, a selected number of Western governments and 
international bodies have imposed „restrictive measures‟ or sanctions. Britain and the 
USA were the first two countries to make a strong case for sanctions against the Mugabe 
regime in the early 2000s. In addition, the EU, the governments of Canada, Switzerland, 
Australia and New Zealand have also imposed certain restrictive measures on the 
Mugabe regime over the past decade.  
 
 
A closer examination of Zimbabwe‟s political and economic problems in the past decade 
suggests that there are partly the direct result of a well orchestrated and systematic 
campaign to effect „regime change‟ through an economic meltdown. This template has 
been used before, particularly in Cuba and Chile in the 1960s and 1970s respectively. 
One of the major causes for the deterioration of the economy is an acute shortage of 
foreign currency.  Since 2000, Zimbabwe has been unable to obtain finance or credit 
facilities from international lenders to inject into the economy. And this is a direct 
consequence of a sanctions regime imposed against Zimbabwe by particularly the US, 
and the EU. The US and the EU collectively have a controlling voting power in the 
Breton Woods institutions. The US sanctions legislation on Zimbabwe, that is, Zimbabwe 
Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) of 2001 categorically empowers the 
US to use its voting rights and influence (as the main donor) in multilateral lending 
agencies, such as the IMF, World Bank, and the African Development Bank to veto any 
applications by Zimbabwe for finance, credit facilities, loan rescheduling, and 
international debt cancellation. Thus, through this masterstroke of legislative coercive 
power, Zimbabwe‟s access to finance and credit facilities have been effectively 
checkmated. The sanctions have adversely impacted on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
to Zimbabwe. For example, investors have shied away and FDI inflows have collapsed 
from US$444.3m in 1998 to US$50m in 2006 (RBZ Monetary Policy Statement 2009). 
Evidently, the government of Zimbabwe‟s inability to borrow money from international 
financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank since 
2001 has negatively affected the country. For example, because of this, it cannot upgrade 
its water sanitation and sewerage infrastructure which is necessary to halt the spread of 
waterborne diseases such as cholera. This may help to explain why the country failed to 
manage the outbreak of cholera in 2008 even though in the past like in 1991, the same 
ZANU PF government manage to contain a similar cholera outbreak.  
 
That Mugabe‟s democratic credentials are suspect is not in doubt. It is however immoral 
and unfair to cause the removal of Mugabe from office by precipitating the collapse of a 
promising African country. Zimbabwe used to have one of the best health and education 
systems in Africa. Now, these systems have either collapsed or declined. The crisis in 
Zimbabwe is bigger than the visible and widely reported.  However, what this tells is that 
Mugabe‟s actions have threatened Western interests. In a way, the hostility of Western 
policy towards Zimbabwe has heightened the political crisis in the country. As the 
relations soured, the ZANU PF government has remained determined to maintain power. 
The following exchange between Christiane Amanpour and Robert Mugabe extracted 
from an interview on 24 September in the United States is very instructive in capturing 
the resolve of Mugabe in resisting regime change: 
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AMANPOUR: … we can - we can argue about this. But my question is this: Why is it so 
difficult to leave power in a reasonable way when you‟re up, instead of waiting until it 
gets to this stage? 
MUGABE: You don‟t leave power when imperialists dictate that you leave. 
AMANPOUR: No - no imperialist. You are the president. 
MUGABE: No, there is regime change. Haven‟t you heard of regime change program by 
Britain and the United States, which is aimed at getting not just Robert Mugabe out of 
power, but Robert Mugabe and his party out of power? And that naturally means we dig 
in, remain in our trenches (CNN Online 2010 ). 
 
Recent electoral or colour revolutions in Slovakia (1998), Croatia (2000), Serbia (2000), 
Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kenya(2004) have alerted the Mugabe regime of 
Western-inspired regime change. In all these countries there have been presidential or 
parliamentary elections since 1998 where liberal  oppositions managed to defeat 
incumbents, as a result of elections, sometimes combined with mass protests. The West, 
particularly the US provided support in all of these cases for change through elections.  
 
 
 The Global Political Agreement of 2008: An attempt at power sharing 
 
Yet just as the ZANU PF regime vehemently resisted to the ascendancy of MDC in the 
power stakes, a new working arrangement between the MDC and some African ruling 
parties (notably in Botswana and Kenya) was established. This both dramatically 
increased the opposition bargaining power and raised the stakes of the transition process.  
The Global Political Agreement  signed on 15 September, 2008,
6
 established an interim 
period during which most of the president‟s responsibilities were maintained and to a 
limited extent assumed by the Prime Minister. It should be noted that not only were the 
negotiations conducted under tremendous external pressures, but, partly for this reason, 
the concessions made to the MDC were seen by ZANU PF hard-liners as a sell-out 
imposed by outsiders - a surrender to blackmail. Surprisingly, events in 2008 led 
Zimbabwe to embrace and rekindle the new politics of consociationalism and power 
sharing. Since the Parliamentary and Presidential elections in 2008, there has been a shift 
in Zimbabwe‟s body politic toward consociational democracy, caused by ZANU PF‟s 
legitimacy crisis, a strong opposition and civil society movement; and international 
pressure. After nearly a year of seemingly endless talks brokered by the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), Zimbabwe‟s long-ruling ZANU-PF party and the 
twoactions of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formed a 
coalition government in February 2009. Opposition entry into government is a landmark 
development, and broad segments of the population are optimistic for the first time in  
 
6
 On 21 July, ZANU-PF and the two MDC factions signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
outlining the principles of a dialogue process to lead to a global political agreement to facilitate formation 
of an inclusive government. 
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years that a decade of repression and decline can be reversed. There is considerable 
international scepticism whether the flawed arrangement can succeed and many are 
tempted, with some reason, to second-guess the decision of mainstream MDC leader 
Morgan Tsvangirai to accept the deal under SADC and ZANU-PF pressure (ICG Africa 
Briefing N°59 , 20 April 2009:1).  But he had no good substitutes given a collapsed 
economy and humanitarian catastrophe from which his supporters and constituency was 
suffering. 
 
The new politics of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) of 15 September 2008 ushered 
in a coalition government involving the three major political parties in the country.  The 
power-sharing or consociational model for resolving conflict has recently come to 
prominence in Zimbabwe after having been employed to end post-election crisis in 
Zimbabwe. Minimally, power-sharing involves the construction of a more or less 
inclusive government that represents a broad range of concerned parties, but may also 
include provisions regarding the distribution of bureaucratic posts and new rules for the 
make-up of the security forces and their subsequent management (see Cheeseman and 
Tendi 2010). Arend Lijphart cited in Sani (2009:98) stated that consociational democracy 
is an agreement among leaders of each bloc in a divided society to share government 
involving grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportionality and minority veto. 
Supporters of power-sharing identify three main advantages over alternative strategies of 
conflict resolution (see Cheeseman and Tendi 2010). First, by providing all parties with 
access to power, it offers the shortest route to ending conflict. Second, by allowing for 
broad participation, the power-sharing formula promises to confer legitimacy on the 
government and its actions, facilitating a process of reconciliation. Finally, by providing 
political leaders with incentives to maintain their proximity to power, and hence 
moderate their stances, it is hoped that power-sharing will pave the way for the effective 
institutional reform necessary to diffuse the underlying roots of instability (see 
Cheeseman and Tendi 2010). 
 
Zimbabwe is now entering a new phase marked by a move from competitive 
authoritarian democracy to consociationalism. The three main contributors to the 
transition are the strengthening opposition, a critical civil society and international 
pressure. The ruling elite cannot simply disregard this new reality. It now realizes that it 
is facing a strong opposition and civil society together with their international patrons. 
However, the central role accorded to the military, and the deep divide which developed 
between MDC and ZANU-PF leaders, has made sustaining a power-sharing formula a 
formidable task. Interestingly, President Robert Mugabe has described the new inclusive 
government as a temporary one in which ZANU-PF remains in the driver‟s seat. By 
contrast, Tsvangirai sees it as a transitional process that can stabilise the country, leading 
to elections under a new constitution in two years. In effect, the deal has established two 
power centres and left the ZANU-PF establishment ample opportunities to block or 
undermine reforms. Thus the attempt at conciliation through the Global Political 
Agreement (GPA) has so far provided temporary relief on the problem of a 
confrontational political contest. According to Patrick Chinamasa, the Minister of Justice 
and Legal Affairs, the GPA has offered a “breathing space for ZANU PF to regroup and 
restrategise” (Chinamasa 2009 int.). Arguing along the same lines, Badza describes the 
 15 
GPA as a “resting point, half-way house and respite” (Badza 2009 int.). On the other 
hand, the MDC views the GPA as the only viable way forward (Mukonoweshuro 2009 
int.). Generally, the GPA is regarded as a necessary compromise that will reduce 
polarisation and unnecessary conflict in the country (Chimakure 2009 int.; Musengeyi 
2009 int.; Dzirutwe 2009 int.; Mandiwanzira 2009 int.; Hungwe 2009 int.; Mataire 2009 
int.). Others have treated the GPA with disdain. For instance, Kurebwa describes it 
simply as a elite accommodation and traditional leader Chief Musarurwa was more 
scathing and bemoaned the failure of the arrangement to recognize the role of traditional 
chiefs and leaders. However, the GPA has failed to provide any panacea because the 
country‟s leadership is ill-equipped to deal with the challenges facing the country. 
Furthermore, the GPA does not provide a “ divorce clause or time limit” for its existence 
which may create problems later (Chimakure 2009 int.). Generally, a major weakness of 
the current power sharing formula in Zimbabwe is that the GPA is seen by the major 
political entrepreneurs as a temporal arrangement rather than as a means to an end. Yet as 
noted by a cabinet minister, “ all reasonable people should ensure the Global Political 
Agreement (GPA) remain intact and deliver its objectives” since it was the “only way 
forward for soft landing, short of civil war” (Mukonoweshuro 2009 int.) 
 
 
Lessons from Malaysia              
As noted by Motten and Mokhta, (2006: 320), Malaysia is a relative newcomer to the 
world of the democratic nation-state. In roughly 53 years, Malaysia has established a 
functioning democratic state that has managed to unite various cultural and religious 
groups and has made significant progress on the march toward developed nation status. 
Malaysia operates a federal parliamentary system with the king, known as the Yang Di-
Pertuan Agong, as the constitutional head. It has a bicameral Parliament composed of a 
69-member, largely non-elected, upper house (Dewan Negara) and a popularly elected 
House of Representatives (Dewan Rakyat). The country‟s Constitution stipulates that 
parliamentary and state elections be held every five years. It also empowers the king, on 
the advice of the prime minister, to dissolve Parliament and thus undertake fresh 
elections. The Constitution provides for an independent Election Commission (EC) with 
the authority to conduct elections. Since Merdeka (independence), Malaysia‟s 
commitment to democracy has been indicated by the fact that it has conducted 11 general 
elections at the national and state levels with a high degree of public participation. 
According to Ong (1990), since independence in 1957, the Malaysian government, led by 
the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) party, has been based on a careful  
demographic balancing of the races (bangsa): Malays, who are all Muslim,' and the 
predominantly non-Muslim Chinese and Indians. Thus statistics measuring the relative 
size of the three major races and providing evidence of their relative poverty and wealth 
have been a critical part of modern Malaysian politics and racial consciousness.  
 
The Malaysian model of power sharing or consociationalism is very instructive in the 
management of conflict due to diversity in ethnic, racial or ideological identity. The 
Malaysian model is primarily based on the politics of accommodation. The politics of 
accommodation is based mainly on a recognition of the need for political stability, and 
not necessarily on a recognition in principle of the right of all groups in society to 
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participation, representation and equal status. In this respect, the Malaysian model has 
faced challenges. Thus the system of special privileges or rights of Malays, whilst 
universally recognized, its implementation challenges have been castigated by non-
indigenous people as discriminatory and basically undemocratic. On the other hand, the 
states in Eastern Malaysia  have been particularly sensitive to certain political issues such 
as the Malaysianisation of the civil service, the status of Islam and special rights and 
privileges of Malays or Bumiputeras – the „sons of the soil‟. In a way, the foregoing are 
some of the difficulties being faced by the Federal government in its quest to build a 
viable political system mainly based on building a unified nation from among its diverse 
ethnic groups. In Kuala Lumpur‟s view (or rather UMNO‟s), Malaysia must be a multi-
racial country, but also one which recognizes its basic Malay linguistic, ethnic and 
cultural character. It was the latter assumption or view which was challenged by 
Singapore leading to its expulsion from the federal state. 
 
Despite the above challenges, the Malaysian model of power sharing has been largely 
successful due to a number of factors. Firstly, UMNO which spearheaded Malaysia‟s 
independence movement has enjoyed a relative unchallenged political dominance since 
Merdeka although the emergence of the Reformasi movement has increasingly 
challenged its hegemony (for example the 2008 elections). Secondly, its political system 
is more accommodative than confrontational. In this regard, its political system has 
encouraged pragmatic solutions to divisive conflicts by accommodating representatives 
of all major ethnic groups into decision making positions. This elite accommodation 
formula has generally contributed to Malaysia‟s political stability. In designing its 
political system, Malaysia has constructed a polity based on group building-block 
approach, particularly the creation of Barisan Nasional in the aftermath of the May 13 
riots of 1969. As noted by Nordlinger (1972) cited in Sakdan (2008:325), a grand 
coalition that includes representatives of opposing groups is one of the most salient 
methods of resolving conflict in deeply divided society. Thirdly and perhaps the most 
important factor in the long lasting stability in Malaysia is the relative success of its 
economic model. The benefits of rapid economic development of Malaysia since 1970s 
has trickled down to the majority of the people thereby neutralizing possible or potential 
conflicts. There is no doubt that the economic question is the most fundamental question 
that should be addressed before any other system. Unsurprisingly most states such as the 
Soviet empire fell or experienced crises largely due to failure to address the economic 
question. As Bill Clinton popular campaign adage showed, “It is the economy, stupid”.  
 
In 1969, racial riots protesting the poverty of Malays, the majority of whom were 
peasants, forced a rapid adjustment in relations between the state and the races. This was 
to be effected by a New Economic Policy (NEP) designed to eradicate poverty and end 
ethnic identification with economic role. The immediate effects of the NEP were, first, to 
bring the rural Malay population more directly under state administration, and, second, to 
integrate them more fully into the industrializing capitalist economy. Social policy was 
elaborated to ensure the health and security of Malays, now legally defined as 
bumiputera, or sons of the soil (Ong 1990).  As observed by Jomo (1990/91) it has 
become almost boring to relate the New Economic Policy (NEP) to the events of May 
1969 because this has been expressed so many times before. Usually, there is an 
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insinuation that the race riots of May 1969 reflected underlying interethnic rifts over 
economic matters, thus necessitating the enhanced positive discrimination measures 
associated with the NEP. In other words, the NEP is portrayed and viewed as the 
inevitable, but necessary, response to the divisive interethnic hostilities which exploded 
in May 1969 (Jomo 1990/91: 469). Although there has been considerable success in 
achieving the specific objectives  of NEP with regards to reduction of poverty and 
interethnic wealth and occupational redistribution, interethnic antagonisms have 
continued due to the implementation of the NEP. Some have argued that the NEP‟s 
means have become ends in themselves, while the NEP‟s ends have declined in 
significance as a policy of priority. In conclusion, it is clear that in spite of its success the 
Malaysian consociational model shows that managing diversity is a perpetual challenge 
that needs constant re-examination and assessment. 
 
 
The way forward  
 
While it is not my intention to examine the impact of the Malaysian power sharing model 
on Zimbabwe in depth, it is useful to quickly point out some of the major pertinent 
lessons in order to recommend positions that may be helpful to Zimbabwe. What 
implications for policy can we draw from these reflections on the power sharing formula 
concocted in Malaysia? The first lesson to be drawn from the Malaysian experience is 
that formal agreements are useless unless they address underlying dynamics of the 
political economy. Earlier power sharing accords were bound to fail in the long run 
because they did not address the fundamental obstacle to racial reconciliation in 
Zimbabwe, that is, the problem that few whites (3 % of the population) controlled the 
commanding heights of the economy. There was probably no country in the world that 
had a more unequal division of income and wealth between the whites and blacks than 
Zimbabwe both in the colonial and post-colonial periods. In the end the power sharing 
arrangements represented a reconciliation of interests rather than of attitudes. Essentially, 
the whites felt indispensable and as such assumed that they would get away with 
anything. On the other hand, the black elites were naïve to assume that overtime the 
whites would lose their economic control willingly. It was anticipated that economic 
transition would occur naturally over time as whites leave or die and are replaced by 
blacks (Herbst 1988/89: 52). The whites were not prepared to lose their privileged status 
without a fight. Thus, at Lancaster, the nationalists were too preoccupied with capturing 
power and forgot that economic transition will be much a more difficult hurdle. The 
white elites who were likely advised by their British „kith and kin‟ ensured that their 
property rights were enshrined in the constitution. To buttress their position, the third arm 
of government, the judiciary remained dominated by the whites for a considerable time in 
the post-independence era until ZANU PF‟s intervention   According to Patrick 
Chimamasa, Zimbabwe‟s Minister of Justice the British had “hoodwinked us at 
Lancaster” and had “enshrined and institutionalised their stolen property into property 
rights”( Chinamasa 2009 int.).  
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A second major lesson from the Malaysian experience is that any proposed solution 
required detailed planning on the part of the political entrepreneurs to ensure that the 
economic question is addressed.  Attempts at addressing  economic power sharing in 
Zimbabwe, particularly in the past decade have not taken into account the objective 
reality of the country‟s economy. There is no doubt that the fast track land reform 
programme of 2000 was a noble policy decision taken by the Zimbabwe government, 
however, its implementation aspect has had far reaching ramifications on the agro-based 
economy in various ways. The programme was pre-occupied with the redistribution side 
and completely ignored the productivity question. As a result basic agricultural 
commodity production including the staple food crop, maize have charted a downward 
spiral. Wheat and meat production dropped drastically, while tobacco virtually 
disappeared from the statistics. Cotton, which is a crucial export crops, also declined. The 
result was that the authorities, who had to keep down increases in the price of imported 
basic necessities such as rice, oil, and flour among others, had to divert much needed 
investment capital to consumption. The Third Chimurenga also hit other agricultural 
sectors. According to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Mines, Energy, 
Environment and Tourism Report on the impact of land resettlement exercise on wildlife 
farming, the Third Chimurenga also negatively affected Zimbabwe‟s wildlife industry. 
The report noted that most of the people who resettled into conservancies  were geared 
for crop farming and had little regard to wildlife farming. Furthermore over 160 000 
farmer workers largely foreign nationals from Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia were 
massively displaced by the land reforms resulting in a majority of them living in penury 
and abject poverty. Furthermore, the implementation of the „Fast Track‟ land distribution 
programme of 2000, compounded the country‟s challenges by triggering the  imposition 
of direct and indirect sanctions from the Western community. These sanctions 
contributed to the polarization of national and international media and the domestic 
political environment and also led to negative travel advisories that in turn heavily 
affected the tourism industry. The Zimbabwean economy has been on a downward spiral 
since, registering a growth rate of 0.9% in 1998, declining to 0.5% in 1999, and negative 
growth rates since 2000-2001. 
 
However, the course of Zimbabwe has entered a new phase marked by the the 2008 
Global political Agreement (GPA) which was undoubtedly the culmination of various 
developments in the preceding decade. In the March 2008 elections, the electorate, 
especially in the urban areas, rejected the ZANU PF government whilst the rural–based 
electorate supported it. In other words the country was in a stalemate. As with most basic 
explanations for complex social phenomena, there is undoubtedly some truth in this 
explanation. Nonetheless, the ZANU PF elite retained control of the government because 
of the strength of its coercive power. Despite the formation of the inclusive government 
in 2009, the crisis in Zimbabwe has not waned.  
 
In their study, Hatzell and Hoddie (2003) examine how power-sharing institutions might 
best be designed to stabilize the transition to enduring peace among former enemies 
following the negotiated settlement of civil wars. They identify four different forms of 
power sharing based on whether the intent of the policy is to share or divide power 
among rivals along its political, territorial, military, or economic dimension. Employing 
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the statistical methodology of survival analysis to examine the 38 civil wars resolved via 
the process of negotiations between 1945 and 1998, the study finds that the more 
dimensions of power sharing among former adversaries specified in a peace agreement 
the higher is the likelihood that peace will endure. Hartzell and Hoddie suggest that this 
relationship obtains because of the unique capacity of power-sharing institutions to foster 
a sense of security among former enemies and encourage conditions conducive to a self-
enforcing peace. 
 
Hartzell and Hoddie classify different forms of power sharing using a four-part typology 
based on whether the intent of the policy is to share or divide power along a political, 
territorial, military, or economic dimension. In this regard, the political dimension entails 
the distribution of political power among the parties to the settlement. Political forms of 
power sharing include electoral proportional representation, administrative proportional 
representation, and executive proportional representation. The territorial dimension or 
aspect refers to the division of autonomy between levels of government on the basis of 
federalism or regional autonomy arrangements. Rules regarding the distribution of the 
state‟s coercive power among the warring parties are to be found in the military and other 
security configurations. Finally, the economic dimension defines the distribution among 
groups of economic resources controlled or mandated by the state (In Zimbabwe, the 
discovery of diamonds has escalated resource conflict). 
 
Unlike other civil conflicts in which a single set of actors emerges as a victor on the 
political battle- field, the political stalemate in Zimbabwe requires that the new rules of 
conflict management be mutually agreed upon through a negotiated solution as happened 
in 2008. Agreement on these rules is complicated by the fact that it takes place in an 
environment rife with suspicion and concerns on the part of rivals about what the actions 
of others will mean for their safety. Naturally, questions emerge over control of the 
state‟s political institutions, territory, military, and economic resources (diamonds). 
Former adversaries require assurances that no single group will be able to use the power 
of the state to secure what they failed to win on the political battlefield, and perhaps 
threaten the very survival of rivals. Institutional choice in this environment is driven by 
the need to protect the interests of all parties to the agreement. Power sharing serves as 
the mechanism that offers this protection by guaranteeing all groups a share of state 
power. By dividing and balancing power among rival groups, power-sharing institutions 
minimize the danger of any one party becoming dominant and threatening the security of 
others. 
 
 
There are many advantages of including multiple aspects of power sharing in an elite 
pact. Such agreement should have a cumulative effect on the players‟ sense of security, 
with the different dimensions having the potential to become mutually reinforcing. For 
instance, mandates for political power sharing are more likely to be strengthened and 
durable if the military is beyond the control of any single faction that might be tempted to 
use the threat of coup to alter the balance of power that exists in the political dimension 
or to retard efforts at genuine cooperation. Similarly, economic power sharing may 
enhance the prospects of previously disadvantaged groups to accumulate the resources 
necessary to become genuinely competitive in the country. One of the main goals sought 
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by the liberation war veterans in Zimbabwe is institutional change that would provide the 
group guarantees that their legacy and participation in the political life is protected. On 
the other hand, in addition to seeking electoral reforms and participation in the electoral 
authority, a key objective of the opposition MDC is the reform of the state security forces 
and thus erode the alliance between the military and the ZANU PF elite on which 
political power is rested. Once power-sharing institutions are devised that ensures the 
military would no longer operate at the behest of the ZANU PF elite the opposition will 
be ready to behave in less antagonistic fashion. 
 
Another reason in which the inclusion of multiple dimensions of power sharing in a 
negotiated political settlement proves advantageous to the prospects of long-term stability 
is that it serves as a source of protection against the failure to implement any single 
power-sharing provision of the pact. Signatories to an agreement are likely to recognize 
that in the often difficult and contentious process of transitioning from conflict to stability 
there is the potential that some provisions of a consociational agreement will not be im- 
plemented. By specifying multiple dimensions of power sharing in the agreement the 
failure of any one aspect of power sharing may not necessarily result in groups be- 
coming permanently marginalized or unable to provide for their own security. 
 
The main assumption of the foregoing is that the more extensive the power-sharing 
arrangements called for in a negotiated conflict settlement, the more likely it is that peace 
and stability will endure in the long run. This assumption derives from the view that the 
greater the number of dimensions of state power that any one group is prevented from 
dominating, the more secure other parties are likely to feel and as a result remain 
committed to the maintenance and permanence of the existing  political arrangement. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper highlights the importance of taking into consideration the security concerns 
antagonists have in the post-conflict environment. It is argued that the most effective 
means of addressing these common security concerns is for protagonists to agree to 
create multifaceted and comprehensive power-sharing pacts. The more extensive the 
network of power-sharing institutions contending parties agree to create, the less likely 
they are to return to the use of confrontation to settle disputes. Because the security 
concerns produced by conflicts are diverse and varied, the power-sharing agreement 
should be designed to address security concerns of all parties involved. If security 
concerns are addressed more effectively and comprehensively, then peace and stability 
have a greater probability of success. Finally, this paper suggests that, in cases like 
Zimbabwe, the international community can play an important role in ending the crisis in 
the country. Foreign actors should support all parties in their attempts to structure power-
sharing institutions and encourage them to create a diverse array of mechanisms of this 
nature. These efforts to produce extensive power- sharing arrangements through the 
process of brokered negotiation have the greatest potential for establishing a self- 
enforcing peace in the long term. And Zimbabwe is no exception. 
 
 
The author is a doctoral student at COLGIS, Universiti Utara Malaysia. 
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